Corporate coalitions and policy making in the European Union:how and why British American tobacco promoted "better regulation"

Over the past fifteen years, an interconnected set of regulatory reforms, knownas Better Regulation, has been adopted across Europe, marking a significant shift in theway that European Union policies are developed. There has been little exploration of the origins of these reforms, which include mandatory ex ante impact assessment. Drawing on documentary and interview data, this article discusses how and why large corporations, notably British American Tobacco (BAT), worked to influence and promote these reforms. Our analysis highlights (1) howpolicy entrepreneurs with sufficient resources (such as large corporations) can shape the membership and direction of advocacy coalitions; (2) the extent to which "think tanks" may be prepared to lobby on behalf of commercial clients; and (3) why regulated industries (including tobacco) may favor the use of "evidence tools," such as impact assessments, in policy making. We argue that a key aspect of BAT's ability to shape regulatory reform involved the deliberate construction of a vaguely defined idea that could be strategically adapted to appeal to diverse constituencies.We discuss the theoretical implications of this finding for the Advocacy Coalition Framework, as well as the practical implications of the findings for efforts to promote transparency and public health in the European Union.

Smoke rings:towards a comprehensive tobacco free policy for the Olympic Games

Background The tobacco industry has long sought affiliation with major sporting events, including the Olympic Games, for marketing, advertising and promotion purposes. Since 1988, each Olympic Games has adopted a tobacco-free policy. Limited study of the effectiveness of the smoke-free policy has been undertaken to date, with none examining the tobacco industry's involvement with the Olympics or use of the Olympic brand. Methods and Findings A comparison of the contents of Olympic tobacco-free policies from 1988 to 2014 was carried out by searching the websites of the IOC and host NOCs. The specific tobacco control measures adopted for each Games were compiled and compared with measures recommended by the WHO Tobacco Free Sports Initiative and Article 13 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). This was supported by semi-structured interviews of key informants involved with the adoption of tobacco-free policies for selected games. To understand the industry's interests in the Olympics, the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) was systematically searched between June 2013 and August 2014. Company websites, secondary sources and media reports were also searched to triangulate the above data sources. This paper finds that, while most direct associations between tobacco and the Olympics have been prohibited since 1988, a variety of indirect associations undermine the Olympic tobacco-free policy. This is due to variation in the scope of tobacco-free policies, limited jurisdiction and continued efforts by the industry to be associated with Olympic ideals. Conclusions The paper concludes that, compatible with the IOC's commitment to promoting healthy lifestyles, a comprehensive tobacco-free policy with standardized and binding measures should be adopted by the International Olympic Committee and all national Olympic committees.

The devil is in the detail:tobacco industry political influence in the Dutch implementation of the 2001 EU Tobacco Products Directive

Introduction - The Dutch implementation of the black border provision in the 2001 European Union Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) is studied to examine the implications of tobacco industry involvement in the implementation phase of the policy process. Methods - A qualitative analysis was conducted of Dutch government documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, triangulated with in-depth interviews with key informants and secondary data sources (publicly available government documents, scientific literature, and news articles). Results - Tobacco manufacturers’ associations were given the opportunity to set implementation specifications via a fast-track deal with the government. The offer of early implementation of the labelling section of the TPD was used as political leverage by the industry, and underpinned by threats of litigation and arguments highlighting the risks of additional public costs and the benefits to the government of expediency and speed. Ultimately, the government agreed to the industry's interpretation, against the advice of the European Commission. Conclusions - The findings highlight the policy risks associated with corporate actors’ ability to use interactions over technical product specifications to influence the implementation of health policy and illustrate the difficulties in limiting industry interference in accordance with Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The implementation phase is particularly vulnerable to industry influence, where negotiation with industry actors may be unavoidable and the practical implications of relatively technical considerations are not always apparent to policymakers. During the implementation of the new TPD 2014/40/EU, government officials are advised to take a proactive role in stipulating technical specifications.

Exposing and addressing tobacco industry conduct in low-income and middle-income countries

The tobacco industry's future depends on increasing tobacco use in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs), which face a growing burden of tobacco-related disease, yet have potential to prevent full-scale escalation of this epidemic. To drive up sales the industry markets its products heavily, deliberately targeting non-smokers and keeps prices low until smoking and local economies are sufficiently established to drive prices and profits up. The industry systematically flaunts existing tobacco control legislation and works aggressively to prevent future policies using its resource advantage to present highly misleading economic arguments, rebrand political activities as corporate social responsibility, and establish and use third parties to make its arguments more palatable. Increasingly it is using domestic litigation and international arbitration to bully LMICs from implementing effective policies and hijacking the problem of tobacco smuggling for policy gain, attempting to put itself in control of an illegal trade in which there is overwhelming historical evidence of its complicity. Progress will not be realised until tobacco industry interference is actively addressed as outlined in Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Exemplar LMICs show this action can be achieved and indicate that exposing tobacco industry misconduct is an essential first step.

How does the tobacco industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review

BACKGROUND: The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control makes a number of recommendations aimed at restricting the marketing of tobacco products. Tobacco industry political activity has been identified as an obstacle to Parties' development and implementation of these provisions. This study systematically reviews the existing literature on tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations and develops taxonomies of 1) industry strategies and tactics and 2) industry frames and arguments. METHODS: Searches were conducted between April-July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Articles were included if they made reference to tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations; supported claims with verifiable evidence; were written in English; and concerned the period 1990-2013. 48 articles met the review criteria. Narrative synthesis was used to combine the evidence. RESULTS: 56% of articles focused on activity in North America, Europe or Australasia, the rest focusing on Asia (17%), South America, Africa or transnational activity. Six main political strategies and four main frames were identified. The tobacco industry frequently claims that the proposed policy will have negative unintended consequences, that there are legal barriers to regulation, and that the regulation is unnecessary because, for example, industry does not market to youth or adheres to a voluntary code. The industry primarily conveys these arguments through direct and indirect lobbying, the promotion of voluntary codes and alternative policies, and the formation of alliances with other industrial sectors. The majority of tactics and arguments were used in multiple jurisdictions. CONCLUSIONS: Tobacco industry political activity is far more diverse than suggested by existing taxonomies of corporate political activity. Tactics and arguments are repeated across jurisdictions, suggesting that the taxonomies of industry tactics and arguments developed in this paper are generalisable to multiple jurisdictions and can be used to predict industry activity.

Representation and misrepresentation of scientific evidence in contemporary tobacco regulation:a review of tobacco industry submissions to the UK Government consultation on standardised packaging

BACKGROUND: Standardised packaging (SP) of tobacco products is an innovative tobacco control measure opposed by transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) whose responses to the UK government's public consultation on SP argued that evidence was inadequate to support implementing the measure. The government's initial decision, announced 11 months after the consultation closed, was to wait for 'more evidence', but four months later a second 'independent review' was launched. In view of the centrality of evidence to debates over SP and TTCs' history of denying harms and manufacturing uncertainty about scientific evidence, we analysed their submissions to examine how they used evidence to oppose SP. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We purposively selected and analysed two TTC submissions using a verification-oriented cross-documentary method to ascertain how published studies were used and interpretive analysis with a constructivist grounded theory approach to examine the conceptual significance of TTC critiques. The companies' overall argument was that the SP evidence base was seriously flawed and did not warrant the introduction of SP. However, this argument was underpinned by three complementary techniques that misrepresented the evidence base. First, published studies were repeatedly misquoted, distorting the main messages. Second, 'mimicked scientific critique' was used to undermine evidence; this form of critique insisted on methodological perfection, rejected methodological pluralism, adopted a litigation (not scientific) model, and was not rigorous. Third, TTCs engaged in 'evidential landscaping', promoting a parallel evidence base to deflect attention from SP and excluding company-held evidence relevant to SP. The study's sample was limited to sub-sections of two out of four submissions, but leaked industry documents suggest at least one other company used a similar approach. CONCLUSIONS: The TTCs' claim that SP will not lead to public health benefits is largely without foundation. The tools of Better Regulation, particularly stakeholder consultation, provide an opportunity for highly resourced corporations to slow, weaken, or prevent public health policies.

A critical evaluation of the volume, relevance and quality of evidence submitted by the tobacco industry to oppose standardised packaging of tobacco products

OBJECTIVES: To examine the volume, relevance and quality of transnational tobacco corporations' (TTCs) evidence that standardised packaging of tobacco products 'won't work', following the UK government's decision to 'wait and see' until further evidence is available. DESIGN: Content analysis. SETTING: We analysed the evidence cited in submissions by the UK's four largest TTCs to the UK Department of Health consultation on standardised packaging in 2012. OUTCOME MEASURES: The volume, relevance (subject matter) and quality (as measured by independence from industry and peer-review) of evidence cited by TTCs was compared with evidence from a systematic review of standardised packaging . Fisher's exact test was used to assess differences in the quality of TTC and systematic review evidence. 100% of the data were second-coded to validate the findings: 94.7% intercoder reliability; all differences were resolved. RESULTS: 77/143 pieces of TTC-cited evidence were used to promote their claim that standardised packaging 'won't work'. Of these, just 17/77 addressed standardised packaging: 14 were industry connected and none were published in peer-reviewed journals. Comparison of TTC and systematic review evidence on standardised packaging showed that the industry evidence was of significantly lower quality in terms of tobacco industry connections and peer-review (p<0.0001). The most relevant TTC evidence (on standardised packaging or packaging generally, n=26) was of significantly lower quality (p<0.0001) than the least relevant (on other topics, n=51). Across the dataset, TTC-connected evidence was significantly less likely to be published in a peer-reviewed journal (p=0.0045). CONCLUSIONS: With few exceptions, evidence cited by TTCs to promote their claim that standardised packaging 'won't work' lacks either policy relevance or key indicators of quality. Policymakers could use these three criteria-subject matter, independence and peer-review status-to critically assess evidence submitted to them by corporate interests via Better Regulation processes.

International trade law, plain packaging and tobacco industry political activity:the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Tobacco companies are increasingly turning to trade and investment agreements to challenge measures aimed at reducing tobacco use. This study examines their efforts to influence the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a major trade and investment agreement which may eventually cover 40% of the world's population; focusing on how these efforts might enhance the industry's power to challenge the introduction of plain packaging. Specifically, the paper discusses the implications for public health regulation of Philip Morris International's interest in using the TPP to: shape the bureaucratic structures and decision-making processes of business regulation at the national level; introduce a higher standard of protection for trademarks than is currently provided under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and expand the coverage of Investor-State Dispute Settlement which empowers corporations to litigate directly against governments where they are deemed to be in breach of investment agreements. The large number of countries involved in the TPP underlines its risk to the development of tobacco regulation globally.

Regulation as country-specific (dis-)advantage:smoking bans and the location of foreign direct investment in the tobacco industry

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between smoking bans and the propensity of tobacco firms to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). Using international business theory based on the firm-specific advantage/country-specific advantage (FSA/CSA) matrix, the authors show that, contrary to what one may expect, smoking bans at home are an important institutional intervention, reducing the propensity for firms to engage in FDI, even to countries without a ban themselves.

The Policy Dystopia Model:an interpretive analysis of tobacco industry political activity

BACKGROUND: Tobacco industry interference has been identified as the greatest obstacle to the implementation of evidence-based measures to reduce tobacco use. Understanding and addressing industry interference in public health policy-making is therefore crucial. Existing conceptualisations of corporate political activity (CPA) are embedded in a business perspective and do not attend to CPA's social and public health costs; most have not drawn on the unique resource represented by internal tobacco industry documents. Building on this literature, including systematic reviews, we develop a critically informed conceptual model of tobacco industry political activity. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We thematically analysed published papers included in two systematic reviews examining tobacco industry influence on taxation and marketing of tobacco; we included 45 of 46 papers in the former category and 20 of 48 papers in the latter (n = 65). We used a grounded theory approach to build taxonomies of "discursive" (argument-based) and "instrumental" (action-based) industry strategies and from these devised the Policy Dystopia Model, which shows that the industry, working through different constituencies, constructs a metanarrative to argue that proposed policies will lead to a dysfunctional future of policy failure and widely dispersed adverse social and economic consequences. Simultaneously, it uses diverse, interlocking insider and outsider instrumental strategies to disseminate this narrative and enhance its persuasiveness in order to secure its preferred policy outcomes. Limitations are that many papers were historical (some dating back to the 1970s) and focused on high-income regions. CONCLUSIONS: The model provides an evidence-based, accessible way of understanding diverse corporate political strategies. It should enable public health actors and officials to preempt these strategies and develop realistic assessments of the industry's claims.

Standardised tobacco packaging:a health policy case study of corporate conflict expansion and adaptation

Objectives: To investigate opposition to standardised tobacco packaging in the UK. To increase understanding of how transnational corporations are adapting to changes in their access to policymakers precipitated by Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Design: Case study web-based documentary analysis, using NVivo V.10. Examination of relationships between opponents of standardised packaging and transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) and of the volume, nature, transparency and timing of their activities. Setting: UK standardised packaging policy debate 2011-2013. Participants: Organisations selected on basis of opposition to, or facilitation thereof, standardised tobacco packaging in the UK; 422 associated documents. Results: Excluding tobacco manufacturing and packaging companies (n=12), 109 organisations were involved in opposing standardised packaging, 82 (75%) of which had a financial relationship with 1 or more TTC. These 82 organisations (43 actively opposing the measure, 39 facilitating opposition) were responsible for 60% of the 404 activities identified, including the majority of public communications and research production. TTCs were directly responsible for 28% of total activities, predominantly direct lobbying, but also financially underwrote third party research, communication, mass recruitment and lobbying. Active organisations rarely reported any financial relationship with TTCs when undertaking opposition activities. Conclusions: The multifaceted opposition to standardised packaging was primarily undertaken by third parties with financial relationships with major tobacco manufacturers. Low levels of transparency regarding these links created a misleading impression of diverse and widespread opposition. Countries should strengthen implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC by systematically requiring conflict of interest declarations from all organisations participating in political or media debates on tobacco control.